ABSTRACT*
This article, on a thematic plane, engages with ‘representative suits’ or ‘class action law suits’ under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to argue that for the Indian Supreme Court there exists a self-evident and routine ‘assumption’ that decrees under Order I Rule 8 bind all who are “interested”, even if never a (meaningful) party to the ‘lis’. This move, as is argued in the piece, collapses the deliberate legislative distinction between “person” and “party” while eroding the statutory scheme of according finality to the suit, and quietly converts a procedural device into a tool of substantive bar. This piece attempts to unsettle that assumption by showing ‘why’ the reach of representative decrees has been overstated and ‘why’ res judicata cannot be presumed in the absence of ‘participation’ or ‘privity’. It further shows, by invoking the “doctrine of revival” in injunction decrees that ‘how’ enforcement against “non ‘eo-nomine’ parties” is not merely textually unsustainable but also constitutionally unsound when the parties are not given a (meaningful) hearing. The piece, thus, aims to (re)situate class action litigation within its due procedural and constitutional plane, where procedure serves justice rather than obstructing it. In doing so, the piece puts into perspective a ‘jurisprudence of restraint’ that resists the temptation to stretch representation into “estoppel”. Rather it interestingly insists on giving due respect to text (as envisioned by framers of the Code), fairness, and the constitutional values of Articles 14 and 21.
Keywords: Representative suits, Res judicata, Person vs. Party distinction, Procedural justice, Adjudicatory finality
“Justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done”
Lord Chief Justice Gordon Hewart[1]
I. INTRODUCTION
The story of representative suits under the civil procedure is not one of legislative lacuna but of judicial (discretionary) distortion and one must note that few provisions in the current civil procedure illustrate this ‘paradox of precision’ and (mis)application as starkly as representative suits (“class actions”). Accordingly, in this piece, we will note that the procedural law for civil adjudication i.e. the provisions of Code Of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC/Code”), while carefully drafted word by word, have been interpreted concerningly on an unsound premise. This is particularly the case for representative suits under Order I Rule 8 of CPC (“O1 R.8”),[2] specifically when read with the bar of res judicata under Section 11 of the Code.[3] The assumption (of the courts) here seems to be that an Order 1 Rule 8 representative suit decree (“decree”) binds all those “interested”, even if not a “party” to the suit. This in recent interpretations of the court has come to be treated as a self-evident truth in and of itself. Time and again this is done regardless of the fact whether a ‘interested’ party have been meaningfully represented or not, which is self-defeating as it defies basic logic for which O1 R.8 was made.
This is where the piece fills the critical gap by supplying perspective(s) via expostulating inter alia (with a close textual reading of the concerned provisions) that the binding effect of a decree has been overstated in (current) practice of our courts. Consequently, such overextension is not only (i) textually unsupported but (ii) makes the very procedure unjust for the people, the interests of which it is meant to uphold, by providing an effective machinery for enforcing the ‘substantive provisions’ of the law(s).[4]
Building on this premise, the piece makes three interlinked yet distinct interventions. First, in Section II A, it highlights a (often unnoticed) critical distinction between a “person” and a “party” under the Code, which is/was a conscious choice of the drafters.[5] Such distinction which is essential to any claim to attain adjudicatory finality.[6] In the same bargain I further maintain that the conflation of the two results (person and party) has resulted in an impermissible dilution of the bare and express provisions of CPC which are otherwise meant to be construed (strictly-textually) in line with the ‘legislative intent’.[7]
Second, in Section II B, the piece critiques the prevalent understanding that res judicata automatically applies in allrepresentative decrees irrespective of the express wording of the provision(s) in place. Here, I contend that there should not be such automatic application of res judicata bar and the courts must carefully understand the distinction between “person” and “party”. Alternatively for such a bar to operate there must exist demonstrable ‘privity’ to the suit and not mere incidental “interest”. This argument, in Section IV, is further canvassed through the engagement with the ‘doctrine of revival’ of injunction-decrees, wherein the doctrine states that a decree for injunction cannot be enforced against individuals who were/are not specifically named as defendants (‘eo-nomine’ parties) in the original suit. Here, on this account, such decrees are not permissible to be enforced unless the decree is formally revived through a separate suit affording them an opportunity to lis (contend).
Lastly, in Section III, the paper situates this entire inquiry within a broader commitment to ‘procedural justice’ under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, arguing that procedural shortcuts in the name of ‘efficiency’ cannot override the threshold minimum conditions of fair hearing. This is because “procedural law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, [it is] not an obstruction but an aid to justice. [Hence the] procedural prescriptions are [to be looked at as] the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the administration of justice.”[8]
Therefore, the paper in Section V, concludes by interrogating the routine extension of res judicata to the (un)represented parties. Hence it puts into perspective the sound interpretation of Order I Rule 8 vis-a-vis procedural design of the Code, one that respects the promise of being truly representative. This has to be done fairly while resisting the temptation to ‘transform’ procedural devices into instruments of substantive estoppel. Consequently, the larger aim of this piece is to articulate a panorama of prudence in representative litigation which is both attentive to (con)text and justice.
II. STRUCTURAL DISJUNCTION: SECTION 11 AND O. I R.8 CPC
At the outset it would be beneficial for us to peruse the relevant parts of Section 11[9] here:
Res judicata. - No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court.
Explanation VI.-- Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating .
(emphasis supplied)
Further the relevant parts of Order 1 Rule 8[10] for our discussion read:
One person may sue or defend on behalf of all in same interest.—
(1) Where there are numerous persons having the same interest in one suit,—
(a) one or more of such persons may, with the permission of the Court, sue or be sued, or may defend such suit, on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all persons so interested;
(2) The Court shall, in every case where a permission or direction is given under sub-rule (1), at the plaintiff's expense, give notice of the institution of the suit to all persons so interested, either by personal service, or, where, by reason of the number of persons or any other cause, such service is not reasonably practicable, by public advertisement, as the Court in each case may direct.
(3) Any person on whose behalf, or for whose benefit, a suit is instituted, or defended, under sub-rule (1), may apply to the Court to be made a party to such suit.
(6) A decree passed in a suit under this rule shall be binding on all persons on whose behalf, or for whose benefit, the suit is instituted, or defended, as the case may be.
(emphasis supplied)
At the heart of this principal argument lies a careful semantic and structural reading together of the two main provisions i.e. Section 11 CPC (Res Judicata) and Order I Rule 8 (Representative Suits). Here, I use the term ‘structural’ because Section 11 is a general provision i.e. a ‘section’ in the scheme of Code, while O.1 R.8 lies latter in the arrangement in the Code. This is not merely a generic arrangement of respective provisions rather a conscious choice of the drafters, the implication of which is that a ‘section’ operates widely as an overarching umbrella provision across the Code and can be ‘read with’ other provisions, while ‘orders’ and their corresponding ‘rules’ generally do not share this integrative character.
In this regard, it would be germane to highlight at the very beginning that, on one hand Section 11 speaks in terms of “parties” litigating under the “same title”, while on the other Order I Rule 8 consciously opts for a broader term, “persons” having the ‘same interest’. This variance in framing is arguably intentional because it indicates that while Section 11 is concerned with party contending ‘on record’ and a matter “heard and finally decided by a competent Court” affords finality (and rest to the dispute) between the parties, Order I Rule 8, on the other hand, is structured to allow broader representation in matters where ‘persons’ have same legal interest, not necessarily ‘parties’ contending on record. This scheme avoids rigidity and does not allow for conversion of “persons” into “parties”.
Therefore, it is submitted that this distinction becomes significant when courts conflate the binding effect under Order I Rule 8(6) with the preclusive (restraining) effect under Section 11.[11] Accordingly, the term “binding” in Rule 8(6) must be interpreted procedurally to ensure compliance with a decree by those similarly situated, and not automatically elevate the decree to a res judicata bar against subsequent suits by members of the (supposedly) represented ‘class’ who were not formally impleaded or those who were not benefitted by the procedural safeguards like notice or right to intervene meaningfully. The word ‘precluded’ here is used in a ‘bar’ sense, while the word ‘binding’ is only dispute specific and is not a ‘bar’ to bring a fresh suit, on the same facts, between the same parties necessarily. In other words, to put it simply, “binding” is not synonymous to “precluded”.[12]
A. The Res Judicata Bar?
The above distinction is further clear when we refer to Explanation VI to Section 11,[13] which deems (through a legal fiction) that ‘when persons litigate bona fide in respect of a public or common private right, others interested shall be deemed to claim under them’. However, this deeming fiction is contingent on bona fide representation which in itself is a factual determination, and not a presumption per se. Therefore, it can be maintained that the court through this provision cannot (should not) override procedural lapses like non-compliance with mandatory notice under Order I Rule 8(2)[14] or absence of judicial permission under Order I Rule 8(1).[15] As also affirmed in Mst. Sudehaiya Kunwar v. Ram Dass Pandey,[16] that such lapses disqualify the decree from operating as res judicata and the procedural mandate in representative suits is a necessary precondition to finality of any decree/adjudication.[17]
Moreover, on a bare textual reading and then comparing “right” under Section 11 with “interest” under Order I Rule 8, it can reasonably be claimed that the term “right” in Section 11 implies a legally enforceable claim finally adjudicated between defined parties, whereas “interest” under Rule 8 is broader and may include mere stakes in an outcome without individual participation in the lis. Accordingly, it is worth considering the proposition that a decree in a representative suit may bind non-parties in a functional sense but should not preclude them from initiating independent legal proceedings where they now act as “parties”, not merely “persons represented” or for that matter “interested persons”. Further, the Apex Court in Dadu Dayalu Mahasabha[18] rightly noted that a person who was neither named nor meaningfully heard cannot be estopped from independent litigation and as a consequence the decree is presumptively binding in form, but hollow in effect.
B. The Scope of Procedural Niceties?
Here, we would benefit from perusing the oft-quoted passage of Lord Penzance in Hamilton[19]:
“Procedure is but the machinery of the law after all the channel and means whereby law is administered and justice reached. It strongly departs from its office when in place of facilitating, it is permitted to obstruct and even extinguish legal rights, and is thus made to govern when it ought to subserve.”
Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case Sangram Singh[20] has aptly noted that:
“Now a code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is procedure, something designed to facilitate justiceand further its ends, not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretationshould therefore be guarded against (provide always that justice is done to both sides) less the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it.”
“Next, there must be ever present to the mind the fact that our laws of procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that affect their lives and property should not continue in their absence and that they should not be precluded from participating in them. Of course, there must be expectations and where they are clearly defined, they must be given effect to. But taken by and large, and subject to that proviso our laws of procedure should be construed, wherever that is reasonably possible in the light of that principle.”
(emphasis supplied)
Hence our above-mentioned argument, in Section A, apart from these immediately preceding observations, in Section B, is further strengthened, when one relates these procedural provisions in the Code to the principle of meaningful access to justice for individuals, which is constitutionally supported by Article 21 (right to fair trial)[21] and Article 14 (equal protection of laws).[22] These substantive constitutional values argue in favour of allowing the challenge to representative suit decree and non-binding effect of the same even after taking into account the res judicata bar on such subsequent suits as may be filed by the (supposedly) represented ‘interested’ persons in these suits.[23]
Consequently, where a mechanical application of res judicata without strict compliance with procedural safeguards under Rule 8 violates these guarantees, we must take into account the same. This is particularly in contexts where notice(s) was/were deficient or representation was inadequate while passing of these decree(s).[24]
C. Repelling Potential Refutation(s)
One clarification is in order here. As likely counterargument may arise that Explanation VI overrides procedural defects if the representatives litigated on behalf of the public or a group with shared rights. This, however, is untenable when read with the ‘procedural due process’[25] structure of Order I Rule 8, which mandates judicial permission and notice. Explanation VI does not grant a carte blanche to bypass these procedural filters and courts have repeatedly held that the representation must be adequate, procedurally proper, and bona fide.[26] A failure on any of these fronts prevents Explanation VI from triggering the bar of res judicata.
Moreover, the deeming fiction under Explanation VI is indeed rebuttable,[27] and the burden then shifts onto the defendant to show that a proper representation was made and procedural safeguards were observed. Without this, any claim to preclude a party from meaningful representation via a lis under Section 11 is likely very weak in my view.
III. COLLATERAL LINES OF REASONING
Now, this section would canvass a few more sub-argument(s) in support of my above contention(s).
A. Is Similar the Same?
Firstly, a close textual reading of Order I Rule 8 would reveal that a representative suit, by its very design under Order I Rule 8, binds only those whose interest is not merely similar in appearance but truly identical in substance (though this may be debated). Here, one could clearly reason out a view here, to argue that the operative words are “same interest”, not “similar interest”, which leads to a clear textual understanding that the term “same” implies absolute identity or equivalence,[28] while “similar” suggests a degree of resemblance or analogy, but not necessarily complete identity.[29]
Therefore, if the alleged ‘community of interest’ among the represented group fragments under closer scrutiny, say, due to differing stakes, entitlements, or circumstances then the res judicata bar cannot be invoked wholesale as the group’s ‘community interest’ is not represented.
B. The Requirement of Meaningful Representation
Secondly, it might be easily be conceded that representation under Order I Rule 8 is not merely symbolic rather it is fiduciary in nature.[30] This means that the ‘party’ representing the ‘class’ of interested persons owes a responsibility of meaningful representation of due interests of the ‘persons represented’. Here, let us consider the example of a housing society located next to an industrial complex. The operations of the complex generate different harms for different members of the society i.e. some houses in close proximity suffer from air pollution and constant noise while others, though farther away, still face air pollution and water pollution due to untreated sewage and effluent discharge from the factories.
Now assume that all the aggrieved members of the housing society named ‘lawyers society’ bring independent and separate suit(s) against the industrial complex for their respective causes of action. And the court in the interests of expediency entrusts the chairman of the housing society with the responsibility of representing the ‘same interests’ i.e. relief from the harm caused due to factories, of all society members who are affected. But here lies the difficulty, the harms faced are not uniform. There are multiple causes of action, namely air pollution, noise pollution, water pollution, and even heightened sound disturbance for the houses immediately adjacent to the complex.
If the chairman effectively represents only those aggrieved by air and noise pollution, but fails to adequately represent the interests of those suffering from water pollution, then the latter group cannot be said to have been meaningfullyrepresented. This is because even though, in form, they are “covered” by the representative suit decree, in substance their distinct cause of action has not been represented. It would therefore be illogical to conclude that such a decree binds them due to the doctrine of res judicata. On the contrary, arguably, they ought to be free to institute a fresh suit on the same facts, against the same defendant, in the same court and even under the same title, because without meaningful representation of their distinct cause, there cannot be a preclusive res judicata bar even though the formal requirements for such bar seem to be complied with.
Thus, from our above experience it may be maintained that a decree passed in a representative suit may only bind absent parties if the litigation was conducted in a bona fide and diligent manner, truly protecting their interests. The moment the record reveals negligence, collusion, or underperformance by those acting in a representative capacity, the entire facade of binding effect of such decree collapses and the (un)represented ‘class’ retains the right to re-agitate the matter in controversy/issue.[31]
C. True Hearing & Complete Bar
Thirdly, even if one concedes, in arguendo, the procedural ‘validity’ and ‘viability’ of an earlier decree in this context. One would not be convinced that such decree binds parties (un)represented, because the next acid test which such decree must pass is that of the constitutional requirement of a fair hearing, which simply and arguably, overrides mechanical application of estoppel. This is because Article 14 and Article 21 of the Constitution mandate that justice must be both ‘real’ and ‘accessible’.[32] Here, I get reminded of Hewart C.J. who aptly put it, that “justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done”. This in our context means the parties who repose faith in representative suits and the court adjudicating therein must not be condemned unheard unnecessarily just because of a mere procedural nicety of the Code and default of the person (supposedly) representing the ‘class’.
Hence, in any such case res judicata bar when used to preclude those who had no effective participation in a suit, it becomes an instrument of injustice and consequently impermissible. Also, because res judicata is a rule of public policy and not an immutable command that would necessarily override substantive principles of constitutional fairness.[33]
IV. THE DOCTRINE OF REVIVAL
This argument directly flows from the foundational distinction drawn in the first argument above i.e. between a ‘person interested’ and a ‘party bound’, where the legislature has consciously imposed express procedural thresholds before a person can be made constructively liable. In the context of representative suits under Order I Rule 8, this distinction assumes much more significance during the stages of execution of an injunction decree. Here it may clearly be observed that an injunction decree, by its very nature, imposes personal liabilities as it commands specific conduct and restrains a particular action. Therefore, it may be argued that unlike money decrees or judgments in rem, it cannot operate in abstraction nor be stretched beyond the conduct of specific party, constructed and crystallised through pleadings[34] and adjudication[35].
A. What do we have on paper?
Now in the abovementioned context, it would be helpful for us to refer to the ‘doctrine of revival’ which states that if the individual against whom (injunction) execution is sought was not impleaded as a defendant in their name, then the decree cannot travel to bind them without a fresh suit.[36] This is arguably not a matter of just form, it is a substantive limitation grounded in principles of justice, equity and good conscience.[37]
The Madras High Court in Kodia Goundar v. Velandi Goundar held that no (represented) person can be subjected to contempt or coercive execution unless the decree is revived against them through a separate proceeding.[38] The logic of this is self-evident i.e. one cannot be held liable to obey what one never had an opportunity to resist.[39] Further, the court in Siddalingeshwar v. Virupaxgouda, clarified that where notice to parties interested in such a class action fails or is deficient, the deemed representation under Rule 8 will inevitably be not deemed.[40]
B. Getting to the specifics of Injunction-Execution!
Accordingly, it is further submitted that the binding effect under Explanation VI to Section 11 does not automaticallyentitle the decree-holder to execute an injunction, rather the execution provisions under Order XXI Rule 32 specifically restrict such applicability to the person ‘against whom the decree is passed’,[41] and not any similarly situated person. In this context, the person ‘against whom the decree is passed’ means the person on record who was arguing the case before the court i.e. litigating the lis, and not the person(s) that he was presumably claiming to represent.
Hence in this the ‘doctrine of revival’ not just ensures legality, but also allows for the alleged contemnor to contest the extension of liability, assert personal defences to give them a fair chance of hearing in accordance with principles of (procedural and substantive) ‘natural justice’. Consequently, execution of a decree for injunction without prior impleadment of the respective parties concerned and without revival of an earlier decree is not merely irregular, rather it is void for the reasons of lack of jurisdiction as well.[42]
V. CONCLUSION
To conclude, this piece has interrogated a subtle but critical break in the current understanding and judicial treatment of representative (class action) suits under Order I Rule 8 of the CPC. It particularly deals with the interface of Rule 8 with the res judicata bar under section 11. The piece began by advancing the central contention that the binding effect of representative decrees has been overstated, both textually and conceptually and in contemporary judicial practice, thereby (un)settling the procedural balance struck by the legislature. Further, it was argued that the automatic (extended) nature and binding force of decree(s) from representative suits to non-impleaded/supposedly represented individuals conflates the crucial legislative distinction of “person” with “party”. This in turn stretches Section 11 beyond its statutory and conceptual limits.
Therefore, by returning to first principles of representation, notice, and joinder under Order I Rule 8, it has attempted to show that res judicata applies only where procedural safeguards are fulfilled and not in situations where there may be a presumption of its application (on facts).[43] Consequently, a decree passed without eo-nomine participation cannot travel to execution without revival, especially in injunction matters, where ‘personal liability’ demands and is enforced through ‘personal obligation’ only. Ultimately, the piece makes a case for a genuinely constrained and procedurally fairer[44]reading of Order I Rule 8 read with Section 11. This is done with an aim to respect the legislative intent and design, preserve the integrity of not just execution proceedings but all proceedings in general, and to uphold constitutional rights of fair participation against the risk of overbroad estoppel in such cases.
[1] R v Sussex Justices; Ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256 259 (‘R v Sussex Justices’).
[2] Code of Civil Procedure (Act No 5 of 1908) O I r 8.
[3] Code of Civil Procedure (Act No 5 of 1908) s 11.
[4] State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952) 1 SCC 1 para 27.
[5] Law Commission of India, Twenty-Seventh Report: The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Ministry of Law, Government of India, Dec 1964) Appendix I, O I r 8.
[6] K Subba Rao, Commentary on the Code of Civil Procedure (13th edn, LexisNexis 2020) vol 1, 325.
[7] Law Commission of India (n 5) Appendix I, O I r 8.
[8] Kushal Jethi v State of Himachal Pradesh 2023 SCC OnLine HP 1104.
[9] Code of Civil Procedure (n 3).
[10] Code of Civil Procedure (n 2).
[11] John Sorabji, ‘General Principles’, in A Model Civil Procedure Code for England and Wales (Oxford 2024; online edn, Oxford Academic, 21 Nov 2024) https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192848680.003.0002 accessed 3 Aug 2025.
[12] Code of Civil Procedure (Act No 5 of 1908) O I r 8(6).
[13] SC Sarkar & PC Sarkar, Law of Civil Procedure (12th edn, LexisNexis 2022).
[14] Code of Civil Procedure (Act No 5 of 1908) O I r 8(2).
[15] Code of Civil Procedure (Act No 5 of 1908) O I r 8(1).
[16] Mst. Sudehaiya Kunwar v. Ram Dass Pandey 1956 SCC OnLine All 292.
[17] K.G. Plasto Chem (1) Private Limited v. Tulison Industrial (Machines) Pvt Ltd 2009 SCC OnLine All 242.
[18] Dadu Dayalu Mahasabha, Jaipur (Trust) v. Mahant Ram Niwas And Another 2008 (11) SCC 753.
[19] Kendall v. Hamilton (1879) 4 AC 504, 525.
[20] Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal (1955) 1 SCC 323.
[21] Ana Koprivica Harvey, ‘Right to a Fair Trial in Civil Law Cases’ in R Grote, F Lachenmann and R Wolfrum (eds), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Comparative Constitutional Law (OUP 2018) (published online 13 Feb 2018) https://ssrn.com/abstract=3240067 accessed 13 Aug 2025.
[22] Constitution of India, art 14.
[23] Code of Civil Procedure (n 14).
[24] M. Indirani v. Ponnusamy 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 11277.
[25] Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248.
[26] Krishna Hare Gaur v. Vinod Kumar Tyagi (2015) 11 SCC 355.
[27] United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sharada Adyanthaya 1997 SCC OnLine Kar 293.
[28] Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries, ‘same’ (online) https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/same_1 accessed 13 Aug 2025.
[29] Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries, ‘similar’ (online) https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/similar accessed 13 Aug 2025.
[30] C K Takwani, Civil Procedure with Limitation Act (9th edn, Eastern Book Company 2022) 200.
[31] Ahmad Adam Sait v. M.E. Makhri 1963 SCC OnLine SC 71.
[32] M Indirani v Ponnusamy (n 24).
[33]Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay (1992) 2 SCC 524; Krishna Hare Gaur v Vinod Kumar Tyagi(2015) 11 SCC 355; Rajendra Pratap Singh v Rameshwar Prasad (2016) 14 SCC 151; Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd v Janapada Sabha AIR 1964 SC 1013; State of Karnataka v All India Manufacturers Organisation (2006) 4 SCC 683.
[34] Code of Civil Procedure (Act No 5 of 1908) O VI, O VII and O VIII.
[35] Code of Civil Procedure (Act No 5 of 1908) O XX.
[36] Narayanan v Periyadan Narayanan Nair 2021 (3) KHC 211 (FB); James v Mathew ILR 2012 4 Ker 753.
[37] M. Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das (2018) 4 SCC 655.
[38] Kodia Goundar v. Velandi Goundar 1954 SCC OnLine Mad 308.
[39] Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. T.N. Ganapathy (1990) 1 SCC 608.
[40] Siddalingeshwar v. Virupaxgouda 2003 SCC OnLine Kar 98.
[41] Code of Civil Procedure (Act No 5 of 1908) O XXI r 32.
[42] Jatindra Mohan Banerjee v. Nakulchandra Sarkar 1960 SCC OnLine Cal 132.
[43] Entire Members of ‘Maniyani’ Community v. Periyadan Narayanan Nair 2021 SCC OnLine Ker 2397.
[44] Judith Resnik, ‘“Procedures’ Projects”’ (2004) 23 Civil Justice Quarterly 273 https://ssrn.com/abstract=590681 accessed 13 Aug 2025.
*This piece is authored by Mayank Khichar, currently a B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) student at NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad.